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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
Tort Of Invasion Of Privacy Recognized In Maryland
Carr v. Watkins1
The plaintiff, a security guard for a regional shopping
center, brought action against a naval security officer and
two members of the county police department. His decla-
ration sounded primarily in slander and invasion of privacy
and alleged that the defendants, both orally and in writing,
communicated to plaintiff's employer charges made against
him years ago when he was employed by the Navy and of
which he was acquitted, thus causing the termination of
his employment at the shopping center.2 The lower court
sustained demurrers to this declaration, holding that all
three defendants were absolutely privileged as to the
slander count and that the tort of invasion of privacy did
not exist in Maryland. The plaintiff appealed and secured
a reversal, the Court holding inter alia that the tort of
invasion of privacy should be recognized in Maryland in
a proper case.3 In reaching this decision the Maryland
Court of Appeals rejected the lower court's denial of that
tort's existence, reasoning that recognition of the tort had
been quickening since 1890 and that it was presently
firmly ensconced in more than thirty states, would prob-
ably be recognized in several others, and is rejected in but
three.5 Also the Court indicated that both legal writers6
and most courts7 recognize a right of redress for the in-
vasion of privacy.8 However, the real significance of the
instant case lies not in the reasoning employed by the Court
of Appeals but in the fact that, by approving a previous
1227 Md. 578, 177 A. 2d 841 (1961).
Specifically the declaration was in five counts: slander, invasion of
privacy, the divulgence of information without legal right, malicious inter-
ference with contract rights and conspiracy to interfere with such rights.
' The Court of Appeals also held that the privilege as to the slander
count was only a qualified one and hence a defense not available on
demurrer.
IWarren and' Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193
(1890).
The court cited Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 386-9 (1960).
'4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 867 states that "A person who unrea-
sonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his
affairs known to others . . . is liable to the other." See also 1 HARPER
AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS (1956) §§ 9.5, 9.7; PxossER, TORTS (2d ed.
1955) § 97, p. 635.
See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Corporation, 113 F. 2d 806, 138 A.L.R. 15, 22, 89
(1940) ; Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243, 168 A.L.R. 430, 446,
461 (1944) ; 14 A.L.R. 2d 750, 770 (1949).
8 Among other cases and texts the Court cited Graham v. Baltimore Post
Co., Daily Record, Nbv. 9, 1932 (Super. Ct. of Baltimore City), reported
and discussed in O'Dunne, The Right of Privacy, 22 Ky. L.J. 108 (1933) ;
HARPER AND JAMES, 1O. Cit. supra, n. 6; PROSSER, op. cit. supra, D. 6, 637;
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, 1o. Cit. supra, n. 6; Warren and Brandeis, 8upra,
n. 4; PRoSSER, supra, n. 5.
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lower court decision,9 it has approved a new tort for Mary-
land law.
Although only briefly embodied in the Carr decision,
the reasons for the right, as stated by other jurisdictions,
are overwhelmingly logical and soundly buttressed by
precedent. Some courts have stated the "right's" definition
... as the right to live one's life in seclusion, without
being subjected to unwarranted and undesired publicity.
In short, it is the right to be let alone'."'10 Others have
described it as the right of an individual to be protected
from any wrongful intrusion into his private life which
would outrage a person of ordinary sensibilities." The
right has even been said to be one of natural law,'2 but
more practically it seems an outgrowth of the complexities
of our modern civilization and the increased range and
facilities of publicity in these modern times.
The early equity cases which tiptoed on the fringes of
the privacy concept dealt primarily with rights of property
in various letters surreptitiously obtained from their
writers or recipients.' 3  Such cases were responsible for
establishing the framework for what was to become a right
of privacy independent of contract and trust theories 4 and
from the law of libel and slander. 5
9 Graham v. Baltimore Post Co., supra, n. 8. In this dispute the defend-
ant newspaper published pictures of the plaintiff for the purpose of com-
mercial advertisement. Like the instant case a demurrer was filed admit-
ting the facts but challenging legal liability. The demurrers were over-
ruled, but the case was never appealed.
I Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P. 2d 577, 579
(1942) ; CooLEY, TORTS (2d ed. 1888) 29.
n Barber v. Time Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W. 2d 291, 293 (1942).
12Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68,
69-70 (1905).
"In Hoyt v. MacKenzie, 3 Barb. Ch. 320 (N.Y. 1848) it was conceded
that the theft of private letters was criminally reprehensible but that
equity had no jurisdiction to punish crime or to enforce moral duties
except those involving property rights. Here the court found no such prop-
erty right as the letters weren't artistic but merely friendly communica-
tion. However, in the later case of Woolsey v. Judd, 4 Duer 379 (N.Y.
1885), that rule was disapproved "as a departure from previously estab-
lished law", and the solution in the English case of Gee v. Pritchard, 2
Swanst. 418 (1818) was adopted, the Court proclaiming that writers of
letters written for any purpose possessed such a right of property in them
that they could never be published without their consent. Thus was dis-
solved the distinction supposed to have existed between letters of literary
value and those of ordinary friendship and business. Although these
decisions did not utilize the label "right of privacy" as a separate body
of law they did lay the foundation for its subsequent inception.
14 See Holmes v. Underwood & Underwood, 225 App. Div. 360, 233 N.Y.S.
153 (1929) ; Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & Co. 543 (1940). The pre-
ponderance of authority tends to the view that the right of privacy exists
as an independent right and that it is not merely an incident to some
other long recognized rights such as those of property or contract.
IsSee :Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927), 55 A.L.R.
964 (1928).
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It is interesting that the real right as we now recognize
it was prompted by an amusing circumstance involving
Samuel Warren's entertaining exploits in the prominent
Back Bay section of Boston. Warren had become the sub-
ject of hawk-like scrutiny by local newspapers and, re-
senting this invasion, he collaborated with his law partner
Louis D. Brandeis on a Harvard Law Review article"
which shaped the concepts of the right of privacy and its
exceptions so emphatically that variations from that mean
are today unique. The article concluded that the rights
protected, whatever their exact nature, are not rights aris-
ing from contract or from special trust, but are rights as
against the world; and the principle which has been ap-
plied to protect these rights is in reality not the principle
of private property. The principle which protects personal
writings and any other production of the intellect or of the
emotions, is the right to privacy, and the law has no new
principle to formulate when it extends this protection to
the personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal
relations. 7
Obviously the right is a creature of judicial legislation
and for that reason is still the focal point of bitter opposition
in some quarters.'" When Warren and Brandeis called for
their legal advance most jurisdictions were conservatively
hesitant to follow suit and even yet have not begun to
develop the mass of precedent in this area as did the early
starters, Georgia and Kentucky.
Either because these states could rely on the "letter
cases" decided within their own boundaries 9 or because
they felt free to choose whether or not to accept the new
tort" their entrance into this new area, though diametric-
ally opposed in method, was typical of most of the develop-
mental pangs later experienced by sister states.
The leading Pavesich case 21 honestly treated the matter
as one of first impression in Georgia and held that a plain-
16 Warren and Brandeis, supra, n. 4.
17 Id., 195.
1
sTrammell v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W. 2d 708 (1941).
Even as late as this date the defendant argued that the rule announced
in a prior case, which had adopted this "innovation in the common law",
was unsound as the right had never existed at common law. In the face
of that approach the Court spoke of the flexibility of common law which
made such "innovations" possible.
19 Grigsby v. ,Breckinridge, 2 Bush. 480 (Ky. 1867). Here equity decreed
the restraining of the defendant's publishing letters written by the plaintiff
but allowed publication of those he had authored stating that if they were
legally given the defendant as a gift their return was not compellable
even if the plaintiff was the author of some of them.
2Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 69
L.R.A. 101 (1905).
21 Ibid.
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tiff whose unauthorized picture and indorsement appeared
in the defendant's advertising, was entitled to recover for
a direct invasion of his legal rights. These rights, spoke
the court, were guaranteed by natural law and by the
instincts of fair play.22
The law in Kentucky evolved quite differently in that
its development was a gradual process as compared with
Georgia's whirlwind technique. In Foster-Milburn Co. v.
Chinn,23 Senator Chinn sued the manufacturer of Doan's
Kidney Pills for printing his picture and indorsement of
the defendant's product without his consent. The action
sounded in libel but the decision did not rest on that count
alone. The Court, in its dicta hinted that such a publication
without consent was a violation of the right of privacy. 4
Douglas v. Stokes, 5 which closely followed, neglected to
refer to privacy as a principle of law but did speak of
feelings and sentiment even though the decision was based
on breach of contract. Brents v. Morgan26 gave the final
Compare the important case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442, 59 L.R.A. 478 (1902), now overruled by
statute, which scoffed at the right and expressed abhorrance at fabricating
new law when precedent for such didn't exist. This too was a case of
first impression and involved the invasion of plaintiff's privacy by cir-
culating her likeness on a flour box which bore the legend "Flour of the
Family". Although the court referred to the Harvard Law Review article,
it held that the recognition of privacy as a legal principle could only be
done by statute. Gray, dissenting, exemplified the importance of the old
property cases by declaring in effect that if one has a right to protection
against unauthorized circulation of letters, the same right should extend
to one whose portrait is exploited commercially. In short, if a face has a
value, that value is its owner's property until he chooses to give it away.
It is interesting that the Pavesich case chided the Roberson decision by
mentioning that conservatism should not go to the extreme of failing to
recognize a right which the instincts of nature prove to exist. Pavesich
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909).
Compare the English case of Tolley v. J. S. Fry & Sons Ltd., A.C. 333
(1931). Here a candy company published a cartoon depicting the plaintiff
with a pack of defendant's chocolates peeking slyly from his pocket. The
House of Lords held that this could be libel as the jury might reasonably
find that such a cartoon implied that the plaintiff had consented for a
fee to ,be so pictured. Note that under this libel theory if the plaintiff
really does consent to the use of his picture his action would be barred,
the defenses of truth would be available and would preclude recovery.
Under the privacy theory consent would not bring the defense of truth
into play, but recovery, the effect being the same, would likewise be
precluded.
149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912). Here the plaintiff engaged the de-
fendant photographers to photograph the corpse of plaintiff's deformed
child. Contrary to the agreement the defendant secured a copyright on
the photo and plaintiff sued for the unauthorized use of the negative. The
court skirted the necessity of deciding on the privacy issue by finding an
implied contract which limited defendant's authority to use the negative,
thus he invaded plaintiff's right.
2221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927), 55 A.L.R. 964 (1928).
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boost to the formalized acceptance of the right as an inde-
pendent one. Here it was held that a creditor who posted
a sign on the plaintiff's premises declaring a debt
owed defendant constituted an "unwarranted invasion of
privacy. "27
The approach of both the Brents and the Pavesich opin-
ions shows that these Courts realized they were confronted
with a problem not previously resolved. Despite this fact
both opinions chose to stress the existence of the tort as
if predestined, the opportunity to choose was played down.
It is only in this characteristic that Maryland's mode of
adoption resembles that of the aforementioned cases. The
Maryland Court of Appeals justified acceptance of the
right by stating it found nothing in Maryland law to deny
existence of the tort and by so saying quietly entered the
field by wisely avoiding the difficulty of twisting precedent
to fit a mold.
Thus far many courts have been preoccupied with the
problem of whether the tort exists at all and there has been
little discussion of its varied characteristics. Basically
there are four distinct wrongs which, as a group, though
they have little in common except that each constitutes an
interference with the plaintiff's right to be let alone, form
the complexion of this tort.28
The first consists of intrusion upon the plaintiff's phys-
ical solitude or seclusion, examples of which are invasion
of sleeping quarters,29 tapping telephone wires,3° compul-
sory blood tests,"' shadowing, 2 window peeping,8 unau-
2One wonders whether in the Stokes, Pavesich and Chinn situations the
plaintiff's real motives are to sell the pictures and the rights to advertise
for 'the price of damages awarded him. This granted, the "right of pri-
vacy" becomes the "right to advertise." Even so there iW still no reason to
allow business to use names and pictures without the consent of the one
thus exposed.
28Possza, TORTS (2d ed. 1955) § 97, pp. 637-640.
"Walker v. Whittle, 83 Ga. App. 445, 64 S.E. 2d 87 (1950); Byfield v.
Candler, 33 Ga. App. 275, 125 S.E. 905 (1924); Welsh v. Pritchard, 125
Mont. 517, 241 P. 2d 816 (1952). Although these decisions were founded
on privacy concepts they could have been dealt with on a trespass theory.
0 Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 'S.W. 2d 46 (1931). Cf. Chaplin v.
National Broadcasting Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1953) 15 F.R.D. 134. See also Mc-
Daniel v. Atlanta Coca Cola 'Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E. 2d 810
(1939) (where defendant used an electronic device).m Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 NJ. Misc. 633, 16 A. 2d 80 (1940). See also,
Note, Conclusiveness of Blood Tests in Paternity Suits, 22 Md. L. Rev.
333 (1962). In many circumstances liability for compulsory blood tests
could be founded on the basis of trespass to the person.
m Schulty v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 151 Wis.
537, 139 N.W. 386 (1913). Cf. Chappell v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 A. 542
(1896).
8"Pritchett v. Board of Com'rs, 42 Ind. App. 3, 85 N.E. 32 (1908) which
was sustained on nuisance grounds; Moore v. New York Elev. R. COo., 130
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thorized investigation of a private bank account 4 and
intruding on childbirth."
The second wrong involves cases founding a cause of
action in publicity which violates the ordinary decencies,
given to private information about the plaintiff, even
though it may be so that no action would lie for defama-
tion. 6 Such cases include the publication of a picture of
plaintiff's deformed child,37 publishing the details of an
embarrassing sickness,38 posting a sign that plaintiff had
not paid his debts39 and dredging up a reformed prostitute's
past.4°
The third, a vague area at best, consists in putting the
plaintiff in a false but not necessarily defamatory position
in the public eye such as signing his name to a telegram,4'
attributing to the plaintiff views which he does not ac-
tually hold 42 and placing his picture in a rogue's gallery
after he has been exonerated of all crimes.48
The fourth and most clearly recognized wrong consists
of the appropriation of some element of the plaintiff's per-
sonality for commercial use as in the unauthorized use of
N.Y. 523, 29 N.E. 997 (1892) sustained on the ground of loss of rental
value to real estate.
Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34 (1929).
"DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881) which was sus-
tained on assault and battery grounds.
It is interesting to note that in Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299
S.W. 967, 970, 55 A.L.R. 964 (1928) reference was made to that part of
the Warren-Brandeis article dealing with "exceptions", wherein it was
stated that the law would probably not grant redress for invasion by oral
publication in the absence of special damages. Often this brand of logic
is unfair; why, for example, should the plaintiff's sensibilities be pro-
tected against embarrassment by publication of his debt while the defend-
ant can speak of it with impunity. Certainly in such a case recovery on a
slander theory is precluded due to the lack of special damages but why
shouldn't relief be granted under the privacy concepts? Perhaps the rea-
soning is that such offenses are insignificant and the courts cannot afford
the time to punish for mere bad manners.
Fortunately the Maryland Court of Appeals was unimpressed with such
shabby justification and aligning itself with the newer view stated in the
Carr opinion ithat oral communication was sufficient to found an action for
invasion of privacy when that tort's other requisites are present.
17 Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930);
Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912).
Barber v. Time Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W. 2d 291 (1942).
Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927), 55 A.L.R. 964(1928) ; Thompson v. Adelberg & -Berman, Inc., 181 Ky. 487, 205 S.W. 558,
3 A.L.R. 1594 (1918). Contra, Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye Fuel & Ware-
house Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295, 106 A.L.R. 1443 (1936).
'Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (19$1).
,1Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P. 2d 438 (1941).
Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F. 2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951); Prey v.
Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.C. 1948) ; Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38
Cal. 2d 273, 231 P. 2d 565 (1951).
"3State ex rel Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E. 2d 755 (1946);
Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905).
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his name or picture in the defendant's advertising.44 In
this area recovery is allowed only when the plaintiff's name
is both connected and identified with other aspects of his
personality such as his reputation in the community where
he lives. The simple use of a name similar to plaintiff's
is not actionable in itself.45
As far as limitations on the tort are concerned, it is gen-
erally one founded upon publicity and communication ex-
cept for the rather remote circumstance of actual physical
invasion.46 It is, of course, strictly a personal right relating
to the specific individual alone, and suit cannot be brought
by a next friend whose privacy hasn't also been affected
by the embarrassing publication.47 As a consequence the
cause of action does not remain after the death of the
person wronged 48 and because the tort is a personal one
a corporation or partnership, having no personal privacy,
has no "privacy" to be invaded.49 However, they do have
a right to their name and business reputation.50 Another
characteristic of the tort of invasion of privacy is that it
differs from slander, in that in order to recover substantial
damages, no special monetary damage need be proven;51
and from both slander and libel in that the truth of the
matter published doesn't result in a defense.2
The right may be surrendered by consent to the publica-
tion complained of or to a similar form of publicity. 5 Gen-
erally speaking, one who puts himself in the public eye
cannot later complain of publicity which deals with his
" Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E. 2d 306
(1949) ; Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918) ; Foster Milburn
Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909) ; Flake v. Greensboro News
Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).
wSee State v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86, 229 P. 317 (1924) ; Vanderbilt v.
Mitchell, 72 N.J. Eq. 910, 67 A. 97 (1907) ; Von Thodorovich v. Franz Josef
Beneficial Ass'n, 154 F. 911 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1907).
"6 See Walker v. Whittle, 83 Ga. App. 445, 64 .S.E. 2d 87 (1950); Bed-
narik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 16 A. 2d 80 (1940).
4" Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930);
Douglas v. -Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912).
" See the leading case of Schumann v. Loew's Incorporated, 135 N.Y.S.
2d 361 (1954) ; Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W.
285 (1899). C)'. that plaintiff may maintain an action against the estate
of the defendant, Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P. 2d
133 (1945).
9Rosenwasser v. Ogoglia, 172 App. Div. 107, 158 N.Y.S. 56 (1916).
6"Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass.
1934) ; Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks v. Improved Benevolent &
Protective Order of Elks, 205 N.Y. 459, 98 N.E. 756 (1912).51 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905);
Foster Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909).
2Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931) ; Brents v. Morgan,
221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967, 55 A.L.R. 964 (1927).
"Thayer v. Worcester Post Co., 284 Mass. 160, 187 N.E. 292 (1933);
Garden v. Parfumerie Rigaud, 151 Misc. 692, 271 N.Y. Supp. 187 (1933).
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activities.54 Not all of such a public figure's right to privacy
is dissolved by virtue of gaining notoriety, however. He
naturally can still recover for the unauthorized commer-
cial uses of his name or picture,5 for the production of his
"life story" with fiction heavily stirred in 6 and for the
revealing of intimate private life details which are not a
part of his public activity. 7
Often yellow journalism and sensational reporting are
privileged merely because they are justified by the public's
desire to read about one who has suddenly, but not pur-
posefully, placed himself in the public eye by becoming
"hot news".5 s Naturally the privilege is not unlimited in
the scope of its application, but those cases in which the
privilege has been found not to have existed involved the
most bizarre and outrageous affronteries imaginable.59
"The Press is no less privileged to discuss the past than
the present"60 and because of this a lapse of time does not
absolve the privilege to rekindle the public's insatiable
interest.6'
Clearly, the importance of the Carr decision is that it
recognizes, for the first time, the existence of the tort of
invasion of privacy in Maryland. Furthermore, in accept-
ing the view that an oral communication may give rise to
a cause of action, Maryland, it would appear, has taken the
more liberal view among those jurisdictions which
recognize the tort.
ARTHUR K. CROCKER
5 4Estill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 186 F. 2d 1017 (7th Cir. 1951) ; Smith
v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416 (1928) ; Martin v. Dorton, 210 Miss. 660, 50 So. 2d
391 (1951).
"Jansen v. Hilo Packing Co., 202 Misc. 900, 118 N.Y.S. 2d 162 (1952).
5 Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913);
Sharkey v. National Broadcasting Co., 93 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)
(where element of fiction is absent).
51 Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corporation, 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.
2d 670 (1952).
8Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn.
1948); Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W. 2d 972 (1929);
Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 P. 594 (1911).
Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912) (picture of plain-
tiff's deformed child). Also see Barber v. Time Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159
S.W. 2d 291 (1942) (publication of an article concerning plaintiff's
physical ailment).
O PROSSER, TORTS (2d ed. 1955) § 97, p. 644.
1 But here also there are limits. See Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F.
Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939), where a radio drama was made of a robbery
of which the plaintiff had been the shaken victim.
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